The Politics and Economics of Offshore Outsourcing

52 Pages Posted: 3 Aug 2006 Last revised: 18 Nov 2022

See all articles by N. Gregory Mankiw

N. Gregory Mankiw

Harvard University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Phillip Swagel

Northwestern University - Department of Economics; International Monetary Fund (IMF)

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Date Written: July 2006

Abstract

This paper reviews the political uproar over offshore outsourcing connected with the release of the Economic Report of the President (ERP) in February 2004, examines the differing ways in which economists and non-economists talk about offshore outsourcing, and assesses the empirical evidence on the importance of offshore outsourcing in accounting for the weak labor market from 2001 to 2004. Even with important gaps in the data, the empirical literature is able to conclude that offshore outsourcing is unlikely to have accounted for a meaningful part of the job losses in the recent downturn or contributed much to the slow labor market rebound. The empirical evidence to date, while still tentative, actually suggests that increased employment in the overseas affiliates of U.S. multinationals is associated with more employment in the U.S. parent rather than less.

Suggested Citation

Mankiw, N. Gregory and Swagel, Phillip, The Politics and Economics of Offshore Outsourcing (July 2006). NBER Working Paper No. w12398, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=921564

N. Gregory Mankiw (Contact Author)

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