Multiple Listing Service Subsidies and Economic Efficiency
J. OF REAL ESTATE FINANCE AND ECONOMICS, Vol. 14 No. 3
Posted: 28 Feb 1997
Abstract
In an earlier article in this journal Sefton and Yavas (1995) conclude that subsidizing a monopoly multiple listing service (MLS) can be efficient when the curvature of the representative consumer's demand function leads to over-shifting. This paper extends their analysis to a multiple-consumer demand model. It shows that, for the generalized demand configuration considered here, there is in general no Pareto superior MLS subsidy supportable by nondiscriminatory MLS consumer taxes when the Pareto ranking is imposed without the Hicks-Kaldor compensation principle.
JEL Classification: R0
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Turnbull, Geoffrey K., Multiple Listing Service Subsidies and Economic Efficiency. J. OF REAL ESTATE FINANCE AND ECONOMICS, Vol. 14 No. 3, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=9228
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