Multiple Listing Service Subsidies and Economic Efficiency

J. OF REAL ESTATE FINANCE AND ECONOMICS, Vol. 14 No. 3

Posted: 28 Feb 1997

See all articles by Geoffrey K. Turnbull

Geoffrey K. Turnbull

Georgia State University - Department of Economics

Abstract

In an earlier article in this journal Sefton and Yavas (1995) conclude that subsidizing a monopoly multiple listing service (MLS) can be efficient when the curvature of the representative consumer's demand function leads to over-shifting. This paper extends their analysis to a multiple-consumer demand model. It shows that, for the generalized demand configuration considered here, there is in general no Pareto superior MLS subsidy supportable by nondiscriminatory MLS consumer taxes when the Pareto ranking is imposed without the Hicks-Kaldor compensation principle.

JEL Classification: R0

Suggested Citation

Turnbull, Geoffrey K., Multiple Listing Service Subsidies and Economic Efficiency. J. OF REAL ESTATE FINANCE AND ECONOMICS, Vol. 14 No. 3, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=9228

Geoffrey K. Turnbull (Contact Author)

Georgia State University - Department of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 3992
Atlanta, GA 30302-3992
United States
404-651-0419 (Phone)
404-651-2737 (Fax)

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