The Interplay between National and International Law - its Economic Effects Drawing on Four New Indicators
39 Pages Posted: 22 Aug 2006
Date Written: August 2006
Abstract
This paper analyzes whether the interplay between national and international law has any discernible effects on economically relevant variables. The specific aspects dealt with include (i) the difficulty of delegating competence to international bodies in the first place, (ii) the difficulty of reversing delegation decisions, (iii) the way that international law is transformed into the domestic legal order, and (iv) the potential role of national courts in drawing upon international law. The paper asks whether institutional arrangements corresponding with these aspects have effects on a country's risk rating which is used as a proxy for credibility. Credibility affects investment and growth. It is hypothesized that the role attributed to international law in domestic legal orders can improve the credibility of nation-state governments. The paper presents a new database containing information on the respective institutional arrangements in 56 countries. The database can also be used to assess the long-lasting discussion of "monism vs. dualism" empirically. Both the difficulty-of-delegating and the role-of-national-courts indicators have fairly robust effects on credibility. Monist orders do, however, not confer any more credibility on governments than dualist ones.
Keywords: Delegation of Competence, Credibility, Dilemma of the Strong State, International Organizations, International Law, Municipal Law, Monism, Dualism
JEL Classification: F02, F21, H11, K33, P26
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?
Recommended Papers
-
Economic Growth and Judicial Independence: Cross Country Evidence Using a New Set of Indicators
By Lars P. Feld and Stefan Voigt
-
Inflation Culture, Central Bank Independence and Price Stability
By Bernd Hayo
-
By Stefan Voigt
-
Choosing Not to Choose: When Politicians Choose to Delegate Powers
By Stefan Voigt and Eli Salzberger
-
Attitudes Towards Inflation and the Viability of Fixed Exchange Rates: Evidence from the EMS
-
A Public Choice Case for the Administrative State
By David B. Spence and Frank B. Cross
-
Making Judges Independent - Some Proposals Regarding the Judiciary
By Lars P. Feld and Stefan Voigt
-
Economic Analysis and the Design of Constitutional Courts
By Tom Ginsburg