Election Commissions and Electoral Reform: An Overview

Posted: 20 Sep 2006

See all articles by Christopher S. Elmendorf

Christopher S. Elmendorf

University of California, Davis - School of Law

Abstract

This article offers an introductory look at the roles of independent commissions in electoral reform. Part I surveys the range of de jure powers and responsibilities that different countries have assigned to independent electoral commissions, and then explores the functional mechanisms by which these commissions can wield influence in practice. The main lesson is that even agencies whose formal authority over the ground rules of political competition is quite limited (e.g., monitoring and advice-giving bodies) may significantly affect the development of election law, thanks to the mediating forces of public opinion and constitutional judicial review. Part II maps out four subjects for future research: first, the workings of the mechanisms of influence posited in Part I; second, the consequences of combining election administration and law reform responsibilities in the same body, as opposed to segregating these functions in different bodies; third, the relationship between the independent body's structure and powers and its selection of law reforms; and, fourth, the implications of different theories of political process failure for the structure and de jure authority of electoral commissions.

Keywords: elections, electoral commission, electoral reform, election law

Suggested Citation

Elmendorf, Christopher S., Election Commissions and Electoral Reform: An Overview. University of California, Davis Legal Studies Research Paper No. 86, Election Law Journal, Vol. 5, 2006 , Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=931462

Christopher S. Elmendorf (Contact Author)

University of California, Davis - School of Law ( email )

Martin Luther King, Jr. Hall
Davis, CA CA 95616-5201
United States
530-752-5756 (Phone)
530-753-5311 (Fax)

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