Network Competition and Entry Deterrence
23 Pages Posted: 3 Oct 2006
There are 2 versions of this paper
Network Competition and Entry Deterrence
Network Competition and Entry Deterrence
Date Written: November 1, 2005
Abstract
We develop a model of logit demand that extends to a multi-firm industry the traditional duopoly framework of network competition with access charges. Firstly, we show that, when incumbents do not face the threat of entry and compete in prices, they inefficiently establish the reciprocal access charge below cost. This inefficiency disappears if incumbents compete in utilities instead of prices. Secondly, we study how incumbents change their choices under the threat of entry when they determine an industry-wide (non-discriminatory) access charge. We show how incumbents may accommodate all possible entrants, only a group of them, or may completely deter entry. When entry deterrence is the preferred option, incumbents distort upwards the access charges.
Keywords: Telecommunications, Interconnection, Entry deterrence
JEL Classification: L41
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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