Trade Protectionism and Electoral Competition: An Empirical Investigation
27 Pages Posted: 8 Oct 2006
Date Written: October 6, 2006
Abstract
Previous studies have recognized that campaign contributions and lobbies affect trade policy. However, whether or not trade policy affects electoral outcome is far less discussed. This paper thus introduces a theoretical framework to explain how trade platform could affect the vote pattern. Motivated by this, we then estimate such an effect using election data from the U.S. House of Representatives over the last two decades. Overall, we find statistically robust evidence that congressional district weighted tariffs have quantitatively important effects on the House election outcome.
Keywords: Tariffs, Electoral Competition, Campaign Contributions
JEL Classification: F13, D72
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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