Political Fragmentation and Investment Decisions: The Milling Industry in Feudal France (1150-1250)

38 Pages Posted: 14 Oct 2006

Date Written: August 2006

Abstract

Evidence from the medieval milling industry in Northern France (1150-1250) is used to explore effects of political structure on rulers' monopolistic gains and investment decisions. Using Salop's (1979) spatial model as a theoretical framework, we show that investment in watermill construction increased in this period even though political fragmentation, due its effect on rulers' capacity to limit competition, significantly reduced rulers' income. Furthermore, our calculations show that more than one third of the mills actually constructed, cannot be economically justified unless rulers' profit maximization over joint production is considered, and revenues from additional labor allocated to wheat production is included.

Keywords: Technology adoption, competition, political fragmentation, monopolistic gains, watermills, milling, Ponthieu, middle ages

JEL Classification: N43, N63, D20, D60, L20, O31

Suggested Citation

van der Beek, Karine, Political Fragmentation and Investment Decisions: The Milling Industry in Feudal France (1150-1250) (August 2006). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=937247 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.937247

Karine Van der Beek (Contact Author)

Ben-Gurion University of the Negev ( email )

1 Ben-Gurion Blvd
Beer-Sheba 84105, 84105
Israel

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