Incentives and Institutions: A Bottom-Up Approach to Climate Policy

15 Pages Posted: 30 Nov 2006

See all articles by Carlo Carraro

Carlo Carraro

Ca' Foscari University of Venice; CMCC - Euro Mediterranean Centre for Climate Change (Climate Policy Division); IPCC; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels; Green Growth Knowledge Platform

Date Written: November 2006

Abstract

This paper comments and assesses "Fragmented Carbon Markets and Reluctant Nations: Implications for the Design of Effective Architectures," a paper that David Victor presented at the international workshop on Architectures for Agreement: Addressing Global Climate Change in the Post-Kyoto World, organized by Joe Aldy and Rob Stavins at the J.F. Kennedy School of Government in May 2006. By analyzing Victor's proposals for an effective climate agreement post 2012, this paper emphasizes the contribution that game-theoretical analyses have provided to the design of climate agreements. It therefore emphasizes how incentives and institutions play a crucial role in affecting the final outcome of negotiations on climate change control, and how incentives and institutions can be modified to achieve a better control of climate change. This paper also discusses a wider policy approach that can enhance the effectiveness of measures designed to address the climate change problem.

Keywords: Agreements, Climate, Incentives, Negotiations, Policy

JEL Classification: C72, H23, Q25, Q28

Suggested Citation

Carraro, Carlo, Incentives and Institutions: A Bottom-Up Approach to Climate Policy (November 2006). University Ca' Foscari of Venice, Dept. of Economics Research Paper No. 49/06, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=948387 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.948387

Carlo Carraro (Contact Author)

Ca' Foscari University of Venice ( email )

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