Multinational Ownership and Subsidiary Investment

35 Pages Posted: 21 Mar 2006

See all articles by Wendy Carlin

Wendy Carlin

University College London - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Andrew Charlton

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Centre for Economic Performance (CEP)

Colin Mayer

University of Oxford - Said Business School; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Date Written: January 2007

Abstract

This paper examines how foreign ownership affects the investment decisions of subsidiary firms. We find that improvements in the investment opportunities of parent firms have a negative effect on the investment of their subsidiaries, after controlling for the investment opportunities of the subsidiary. This provides evidence of internal capital markets in multinationals that reallocate funds towards units with better investment opportunities. We find that the negative effect of the parent's investment opportunities on subsidiary investment is greatest where parents have modest ownership stakes and are distant from their subsidiaries and when subsidiaries operate in well developed financial markets.

Keywords: Investment, Internal Capital Markets, Foreign Ownership

JEL Classification: F21, G31

Suggested Citation

Carlin, Wendy and Charlton, Andrew and Mayer, Colin, Multinational Ownership and Subsidiary Investment (January 2007). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=958505 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.958505

Wendy Carlin (Contact Author)

University College London - Department of Economics ( email )

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Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

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Andrew Charlton

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Centre for Economic Performance (CEP) ( email )

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Colin Mayer

University of Oxford - Said Business School ( email )

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Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

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United Kingdom

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

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