Toward Common Sense and Common Ground? Reflections on the Shared Interests of Managers and Labor in a More Rational System of Corporate Governance

40 Pages Posted: 30 May 2007

See all articles by Leo E. Strine, Jr.

Leo E. Strine, Jr.

Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz; University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School; Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance

Abstract

In this essay, Vice Chancellor Strine reflects on the common interests of those who manage and those who labor for American corporations. The first part of the essay examines aspects of the current corporate governance and economic environment that are putting management and labor under pressure. The concluding section of the essay identifies possible corporate governance initiatives that might - by better focusing stockholder activism in particular and corporate governance more generally on long-term, rather than short-term, corporate performance - generate a more rational system of accountability, that focuses on the durable creation by corporations of wealth through fundamentally sound, long-term business plans.

Keywords: Directors, Boards, Shareholders, Corporate governance, Managers, Corporate elections, Institutional investors, Corporate social responsibility, CSR, Social welfare, Organized labor, Accountability, Durable wealth creation

JEL Classification: D70, G30, G32, G34, G38, K22

Suggested Citation

Strine, Jr., Leo E., Toward Common Sense and Common Ground? Reflections on the Shared Interests of Managers and Labor in a More Rational System of Corporate Governance. Journal of Corporation Law, Fall 2007, U of Penn, Inst for Law & Econ Research Paper No. 07-25, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 585, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=989624

Leo E. Strine, Jr. (Contact Author)

Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz ( email )

51 W 52nd St
New York, NY 10019
United States
212-403-1178 (Phone)

University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School ( email )

Philadelphia, PA
United States

Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance ( email )

1563 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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