Civil Justice Reform: A Mechanism Design Framework

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Vol. 164, 2008

17 Pages Posted: 3 Jul 2007

See all articles by Alon Klement

Alon Klement

Buchman Faculty of Law, Tel Aviv University

Zvika Neeman

Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics

Abstract

The main goal of the court system is to differentiate between those who obeyed the law and those who did not. We describe a mechanism design framework that facilitates the characterization of the set of procedural mechanisms that would minimize the resources used to achieve this goal. This framework can also help to formulate and evaluate procedural rules, and to identify necessary and sufficient conditions for deciding disputes according to substantive law with minimal costs of litigation and delay. We illustrate our approach using three examples: the design of fee-shifting rules, the design of discovery rules, and the use of third party alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms.

Keywords: civil justice, litigation, settlement, mechanism design, mediation, arbitration, discovery, fee shifting

JEL Classification: K40, K41

Suggested Citation

Klement, Alon and Neeman, Zvika, Civil Justice Reform: A Mechanism Design Framework. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Vol. 164, 2008, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=998028

Alon Klement (Contact Author)

Buchman Faculty of Law, Tel Aviv University ( email )

Tel Aviv
Israel

Zvika Neeman

Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 39040
Ramat Aviv, Tel Aviv, 69978
Israel

HOME PAGE: http://www.tau.ac.il/~zvika/

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
209
Abstract Views
1,353
Rank
266,172
PlumX Metrics