U.S. Adoption of Computerized Physician Order Entry Systems

Posted: 26 Jul 2007

See all articles by David M. Cutler

David M. Cutler

Harvard University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Harvard University - Harvard Kennedy School (HKS)

Naomi E. Feldman

Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Department of Economics

Jill R. Horwitz

UCLA School of Law; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Abstract

Computerized physician order entry (CPOE) has been shown to reduce preventable, potential adverse events. Despite this evidence, fewer than 5 percent of U.S. hospitals have fully implemented these systems. We assess empirically alternative reasons for low CPOE implementation using data from various sources. We find that CPOE is related to hospital ownership and teaching status; government and teaching hospitals are much more likely than other hospital types are to invest in CPOE. Hospital profitability is not associated with CPOE investment. Although greater diffusion of CPOE is needed, it might have to await continuing publicity efforts and substantial reimbursement system changes.

Suggested Citation

Cutler, David M. and Feldman, Naomi E. and Horwitz, Jill R., U.S. Adoption of Computerized Physician Order Entry Systems. Health Affairs, Vol. 24, No. 6, 2005, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1002694

David M. Cutler (Contact Author)

Harvard University - Department of Economics ( email )

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Naomi E. Feldman

Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Department of Economics ( email )

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Jill R. Horwitz

UCLA School of Law ( email )

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

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