Privatized Firms, Rule of Law and Labor Outcomes in Emerging Markets

Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 45, No. 9, 1513–1525, October 2009

25 Pages Posted: 15 Aug 2007 Last revised: 21 Mar 2010

See all articles by Gianmarco León-Ciliotta

Gianmarco León-Ciliotta

Universitat Pompeu Fabra and Barcelona GSE; Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE); Institute for Political Economy and Governance, Barcelona; CEPR

Alberto Chong

University of Ottawa

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: October 1, 2009

Abstract

A recent large firm-level dataset is analysed to compare labour indicators of privatised, private, and public firms around the world, in particular differences relating to wages, benefits, labour composition, education and training, unionisation, and quality of management. We find that labour productivity and the ratio of permanent to temporary workers increase after privatisation.

Keywords: Privatization, Labor, Firms, Institutions, Public Sector, Cross-Country

JEL Classification: O10

Suggested Citation

León-Ciliotta, Gianmarco and Chong, Alberto, Privatized Firms, Rule of Law and Labor Outcomes in Emerging Markets (October 1, 2009). Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 45, No. 9, 1513–1525, October 2009, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1007173 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1007173

Gianmarco León-Ciliotta

Universitat Pompeu Fabra and Barcelona GSE ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27
Barcelona, 08005
Spain
(+34) 93 542-1757 (Phone)
(+34) 93 542-1746 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/gianmarcoleon/

Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27
Barcelona, Catalonia 08014
Spain

Institute for Political Economy and Governance, Barcelona ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
Barcelona, 08005
Spain

CEPR ( email )

London
United Kingdom

Alberto Chong (Contact Author)

University of Ottawa ( email )

2292 Edwin Crescent
Ottawa, Ontario K2C 1H7
Canada

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