Why is Law Enforcement Decentralized?

CIRPEE Working Paper No. 07-19

26 Pages Posted: 21 Aug 2007

See all articles by Guillaume Cheikbossian

Guillaume Cheikbossian

University of Toulouse 1 - Groupe de Recherche en Economie Mathématique et Quantitative (GREMAQ)

Nicolas Marceau

Centre Interuniversitaire sur le Risque, les Politiques Economiques et l'Emploi (CIRPEE)

Date Written: August 2007

Abstract

Law enforcement is decentralized. It is so despite documented interjurisdictional externalities which would justify its centralization. To explain this fact, we construct a political economy model of law enforcement. Under decentralization, law enforcement in each region is in accord with the preferences of regional citizens, but interjurisdictional externalities are neglected. Under centralization, law enforcement for all regions is chosen by a legislature of regional representatives which may take externalities into account. However, the majority rule applies for decisions made by the central legislature and this implies that the allocation of enforcement resources may be skewed in favour of those who belong to the required majority. We show that the choice between centralization and decentralization depends on the technology of law enforcement and the nature of the interjurisdictional externalities.

Keywords: crime, law enforcement, decentralization, externalities

JEL Classification: K42

Suggested Citation

Cheikbossian, Guillaume and Marceau, Nicolas, Why is Law Enforcement Decentralized? (August 2007). CIRPEE Working Paper No. 07-19, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1007699 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1007699

Guillaume Cheikbossian

University of Toulouse 1 - Groupe de Recherche en Economie Mathématique et Quantitative (GREMAQ) ( email )

Manufacture des Tabacs
21 Allees de Brienne
Toulouse, 31000
France

Nicolas Marceau (Contact Author)

Centre Interuniversitaire sur le Risque, les Politiques Economiques et l'Emploi (CIRPEE) ( email )

Ste-Foy, Quebec G1K 7P4
Canada

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