Long-Run Selection and the Work Ethic

22 Pages Posted: 11 Sep 2007

See all articles by Karl Warneryd

Karl Warneryd

Stockholm School of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)

Jens Josephson

Stockholm University; Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)

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Abstract

That individuals contribute in social dilemma interactions even when contributing is costly is a well-established observation in the experimental literature. Since a contributor is always strictly worse off than a non-contributor the question is raised if an intrinsic motivation to contribute can survive in an evolutionary setting. Applying stochastic evolutionary dynamics we give conditions for equilibria with a positive number of contributors to be selected in the long run.

Keywords: work ethic, evolution, public goods, stochastic dynamics

JEL Classification: C72, D23, H41, M14, Z13

Suggested Citation

Warneryd, Karl and Josephson, Jens, Long-Run Selection and the Work Ethic. Games and Economic Behavior, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1012069

Karl Warneryd (Contact Author)

Stockholm School of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 6501
S-113 83 Stockholm
Sweden
+46 8 736 9206 (Phone)
+46 8 347 818 (Fax)

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Jens Josephson

Stockholm University ( email )

Sweden

Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN) ( email )

Box 55665
Grevgatan 34, 2nd floor
Stockholm, SE-102 15
Sweden

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