Determining the Appropriate Level of Deference for Domestic Court Reviews of Investor-State Arbitral Awards

24 Pages Posted: 3 Oct 2007

See all articles by Barnali Choudhury

Barnali Choudhury

University College London - Faculty of Laws; York University - Osgoode Hall Law School

Abstract

Judicial review of investor-state arbitral awards is often performed by domestic courts that are unfamiliar with issues of treaty interpretation and international law. According to international law, the grounds for review of international arbitral awards are in theory quite narrow. Nevertheless, a review of three decisions from Canadian courts suggests that Canadian domestic courts have construed the grounds for review broadly enough to allow them to review the merits of international arbitral awards.

In general, domestic courts may not be well-equipped to grapple with international arbitral awards. These courts often view their role as that of supervising international tribunals in the way that they supervise domestic tribunals. This article argues that domestic courts should primarily act as enforcers of international arbitral awards, interfering only in cases of egregious error. This high level of deference will encourage international commercial activity, further the harmonization of international arbitration laws, and provide for greater certainty in international business transactions.

Keywords: investment, international arbitration, judicial review

Suggested Citation

Choudhury, Barnali, Determining the Appropriate Level of Deference for Domestic Court Reviews of Investor-State Arbitral Awards. Queen's Law Journal, Vol. 32, No. 602, 2007, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1018204

Barnali Choudhury (Contact Author)

University College London - Faculty of Laws ( email )

Bentham House, Endsleigh Gardens
London, WC1E OEG
United Kingdom

York University - Osgoode Hall Law School ( email )

4700 Keele Street
Toronto, Ontario M3J 1P3
Canada

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
239
Abstract Views
1,644
Rank
233,480
PlumX Metrics