Pursuing Geopolitical Stability through Interregional Trade: The EU's Motives for Negotiating with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)

CIGI Working Paper No. 31

43 Pages Posted: 4 Oct 2007

See all articles by Agata Antkiewicz

Agata Antkiewicz

Centre for International Governance and Innovation (CIGI)

Bessma Momani

University of Waterloo - Department of Political Science

Date Written: September 2007

Abstract

The European Union's (EU) drawn-out trade negotiations with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) could result in the first region-to-region free trade agreement. The EU's motives for advancing interregional negotiations with the GCC have not been primarily focused on creating trade, which is argued to be relatively limited for the EU. Instead, the EU's motives for continuing negotiations with the GCC are explained by the EU's geopolitical and ideational interests and to a lesser extent by interest group influences. We do not find, however, strong evidence of EU bureaucratic motives to negotiate with the GCC. Based on these findings, this paper suggests that the recent reawakening of EU-GCC negotiations can be explained by the relative increase in the geopolitical importance of the Gulf.

Keywords: International Trade, Interregional Trade, European Union, EU, Gulf Cooperation Council, GCC, negotiations, trade rules

Suggested Citation

Antkiewicz, Agata and Momani, Bessma, Pursuing Geopolitical Stability through Interregional Trade: The EU's Motives for Negotiating with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) (September 2007). CIGI Working Paper No. 31, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1019093 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1019093

Agata Antkiewicz

Centre for International Governance and Innovation (CIGI) ( email )

57 Erb Street West
Waterloo, Ontario N2L 6C2
Canada

Bessma Momani (Contact Author)

University of Waterloo - Department of Political Science ( email )

200 University Avenue West
Waterloo, Ontario N2L 6C2
Canada

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