Upper Houses, Democracy and Executive Accountability

Abstract

Arguments for and against upper houses take many forms. This article has two objectives. The first objective is to defend a classification of these arguments into four basic, but by no means mutually exclusive, lines of reasoning. These lines of reasoning, it is argued, are concerned respectively with (1) democratic representation, (2) public deliberation, (3) legislative outputs and (4) scrutiny of executive government. In describing and discussing these four lines of reasoning, the article also draws attention to the special role in the debate played by arguments from government efficiency and the separation of powers, and shows how these arguments operate against a backdrop of wider debates over the relative merits of parliamentary and presidential systems of government.

The second objective of the article is to evaluate these lines of argument with a view to drawing some specific conclusions about the roles performed by upper houses within the Australian State political systems, especially noting proposals for the reform or abolition of South Australia's upper house, and the outright absence of an upper house in Queensland. The general objective of the article is to show how the four types of argument can be marshalled in support of upper houses generally, as well as in support particularly of the proposition that South Australians would do best to retain their existing Legislative Council (albeit perhaps with some modest reform) and that Queenslanders would do well to consider the reestablishment of a modern second chamber in the place of the nominated chamber that was abolished in 1922.

Keywords: upper house, second chamber, bicameral, unicameral, parliament, legislature, government accountability, responsible government