Human Motivation and Social Cooperation: Experimental and Analytical Foundations

Posted: 20 Dec 2007

See all articles by Ernst Fehr

Ernst Fehr

University of Zurich - Department of Economics

Herbert Gintis

Santa Fe Institute; Central European University

Abstract

Since Durkheim, sociological explanations of social cooperation have emphasized the internalization of values that induce norm compliance. Since Adam Smith, economic explanations of social cooperation have emphasized incentives that induce selfish individuals to cooperate. Here, we develop a general approach¿the Beliefs, Preferences, and Constraints approach - showing that each of the above models is a special case. Our approach is based on evidence indicating that pure Homo Sociologicus and pure Homo Economicus views are wrong. We show that self-regarding and norm-regarding actors coexist and that the available action opportunities determine which of these actor types dominates the aggregate level of social cooperation. Our approach contributes to the solution of long-standing problems, including the problems of social order and collective action, the determinants and consequences of social exchanges, the microfoundations of emergent aggregate patterns of social interactions, and the measurement of the impact of cultural and economic practices on individuals' social goals.

Keywords: social order, social exchange, cooperation, punishment, strong reciprocity

Suggested Citation

Fehr, Ernst and Gintis, Herbert and Gintis, Herbert, Human Motivation and Social Cooperation: Experimental and Analytical Foundations. Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 33, August 2007, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1077628

Ernst Fehr (Contact Author)

University of Zurich - Department of Economics ( email )

Blümlisalpstrasse 10
Zuerich, 8006
Switzerland
+41 1 634 3709 (Phone)
+41 1 634 4907 (Fax)

Herbert Gintis

Santa Fe Institute ( email )

1399 Hyde Park Road
Santa Fe, NM 87501
United States

Central European University

Nador utca 9
Budapest, H-1051
Hungary
413-586-7756 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www-unix.oit.umass.edu/~gintis

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