Subgame Perfect Implementation with Almost Perfect Information
39 Pages Posted: 11 Jan 2008
Date Written: January 2008
Abstract
The theory of incomplete contracts has been recently questioned using or extending the subgame perfect implementation approach of Moore and Repullo (1988). We consider the robustness of this mechanism to the introduction of small amounts of asymmetric information. Our main result is that the mechanism may not yield (even approximately) truthful revelation as the amount of asymmetric information goes to zero.
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