Networks of Regulatory Agencies as Regional Public Goods: Improving Infrastructure Performance

Review of International Organizations, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 179-200, June 2008

22 Pages Posted: 5 Feb 2008 Last revised: 8 Jan 2009

See all articles by Jacqueline Horrall

Jacqueline Horrall

Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh at Greensburg

Sanford V. Berg

University of Florida - Department of Economics

Abstract

Networks of sectoral regulatory agencies provide regional public goods (RPGs). In developed and developing countries, the telecommunications, energy, and water sectors have been re-structured (frequently liberalized) and reformed over the past two decades. Often with seed money from international organizations and donor countries, regulatory leaders at newly created commissions sought to learn from neighboring countries. Regional networks provided vehicles for sharing data and best-practice techniques, developing studies, providing training, distributing regulatory materials, and organizing meetings. Three properties of publicness of RPGs influence the provision of RPGs: non-rivalry of benefits, non-excludability of non-payers, and the aggregation technology. External donor funding and the mix of characteristics have influenced the pattern of network activities.

Keywords: regional public goods, regulatory networks, infrastructure, collective action

Suggested Citation

Horrall, Jacqueline and Berg, Sanford V., Networks of Regulatory Agencies as Regional Public Goods: Improving Infrastructure Performance. Review of International Organizations, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 179-200, June 2008 , Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1089572

Jacqueline Horrall

Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh at Greensburg ( email )

132 Faculty Office Building
Greensburg, PA 15601-5860
United States

Sanford V. Berg (Contact Author)

University of Florida - Department of Economics ( email )

Gainesville, FL 32611-7140
United States
352-392-0132 (Phone)
352-392-7796 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.cba.ufl.edu/purc/facultyinfo.asp?WEBID=1260

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