The Regulatory Dance in Tax Competition - A Case Study in Multi-Lateral Governance

30 Pages Posted: 4 Feb 2008 Last revised: 4 Jun 2009

See all articles by George Gilligan

George Gilligan

University of Melbourne - Centre for Corporate Law

Date Written: February 2008

Abstract

As the pace and intensity of globalisation gathers pace and national economies become more inter-dependent, so there grows a greater emphasis on the structures and processes of multi-lateral governance. This paper shows these processes at work by examining the efforts in recent years by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to shape what should be prevailing international standards in the area of tax competition through its various initiatives regarding what the OECD terms Harmful Tax Practices. The analysis highlights the strategic importance of: accountability and governance; relative strengths/weaknesses of international protocols, eg treaties, conventions, frameworks of understanding; the appropriate roles of regulatory actors - national, regional and international; the inevitable effects of self-interest on both regulated and regulating actors; and regulatory capacity, especially in less developed economies. The paper's case study illustrates the regulatory reality that political contexts, allied with issues of power and legitimacy are crucial in determining how much impact in reality a multi-lateral regulatory actor such as the OECD can have.

Keywords: multi-lateral governance, OECD, tax competition

Suggested Citation

Gilligan, George, The Regulatory Dance in Tax Competition - A Case Study in Multi-Lateral Governance (February 2008). Monash U. Department of Business Law & Taxation Research Paper No. 12, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1090118 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1090118

George Gilligan (Contact Author)

University of Melbourne - Centre for Corporate Law ( email )

185 Pelham Street, Carlton, Building 106
Victoria 3010
Australia
+61 3 8344 1079 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.law-ccl@unimelb.edu.au

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