Dworkin on the Semantics of Legal and Political Concepts

Posted: 29 Feb 2008

See all articles by Dennis Patterson

Dennis Patterson

Rutgers University School of Law, Camden; University of Surrey - School of Law

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Date Written: 2006

Abstract

In a recent comment on H.L.A. Hart's 'Postscript' to The Concept of Law, Ronald Dworkin claims that the meaning of legal and political concepts may be understood by analogy to the meaning of natural kind concepts like 'tiger', 'gold' and 'water'. This article questions the efficacy of Dworkin's claims by challenging the use of natural kinds as the basis for a semantic theory of legal and political concepts. Additionally, in matters of value there is no methodological equivalent to the scientific method. Thus, there is little hope of finding hidden essences to explain the meaning of legal and political concepts. Finally, even if there are natural kinds, Dworkin's arguments for their efficacy in jurisprudence are problematic and unpersuasive. The problem for Dworkin is that his embrace of natural kinds undermines the 'fit' side of the fit/justification model of adjudication that lies at the heart of his theory of law.

Suggested Citation

Patterson, Dennis, Dworkin on the Semantics of Legal and Political Concepts ( 2006). Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 26, Issue 3, pp. 545-557, 2006, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1096829 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ojls/gql017

Dennis Patterson (Contact Author)

Rutgers University School of Law, Camden ( email )

Camden, NJ 08102-1203
United States
856-225-6369 (Phone)
856-751-8752 (Fax)

University of Surrey - School of Law ( email )

United Kingdom

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