Corporate Corruption and the Complicity of Congress and the Supreme Court - the Tortuous Path from Central Bank to Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.

Posted: 28 Feb 2008

See all articles by Charles W. Murdock

Charles W. Murdock

Loyola University Chicago School of Law; Loyola University of Chicago

Date Written: 2/24/2008

Abstract

This article asserts that Congress and the federal courts are complicit in the widespread corporate corruption that has come to light this past decade. It begins by exploring the notion of bias and then chronicles judicial developments which have protected corporate officials, who have engaged in securities fraud and other wrongful conduct, at the expense of innocent shareholders and investors. It also analyzes the public policy in favor of corruption embodied in the Private Litigation Securities Reform Act, and the actions of federal courts in expanding the protection of PLSRA even beyond that dictated by the language of the statute. It concludes with a strong criticism of the most recent decision of the Supreme Court in Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S.Ct. 761 (2008), where the Supreme Court once again protected wrongdoers, who had engaged in unconscionable conduct, from judicial accountability.

Keywords: corporate corruption, Private Litigation Securities Reform Act, scienter, management, boards of directors,particularity, Supreme Court

JEL Classification: K22, K41, G28, G32, G38

Suggested Citation

Murdock, Charles W., Corporate Corruption and the Complicity of Congress and the Supreme Court - the Tortuous Path from Central Bank to Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. (2/24/2008). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1098300

Charles W. Murdock (Contact Author)

Loyola University Chicago School of Law ( email )

25 E. Pearson
Chicago, IL 60611
United States

Loyola University of Chicago ( email )

25 East Pearson Street
Chicago, IL 60611

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