Efficiency Enhancing Taxation in Two-Sided Markets
20 Pages Posted: 25 Mar 2008
Date Written: March 2008
Abstract
This paper examines the efficient provision of goods in two-sided markets and characterizes optimal specific and ad-valorem taxes. We show that (i) a monopoly may have too high output compared to the social optimum; (ii) output may be reduced by imposing negative value-added taxes (subsidy) or positive specific taxes.
JEL Classification: D4, D43, H21, H22, L13
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Kind, Hans Jarle and Köthenbürger, Marko and Schjelderup, Guttorm, Efficiency Enhancing Taxation in Two-Sided Markets (March 2008). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 2262, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1113024 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1113024
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