The Political Economy of Genocide Intervention: Structural Conditionality, Collective Command Responsibility, and the Former Yugoslavia
29 Pages Posted: 14 May 2008
Date Written: May 12, 2008
Abstract
We examine the use of structural conditionality as a tool for genocide intervention. Structural conditionality is the practice of powerful global actors such as the World Bank providing assistance to countries contingent on economic, political and legal reforms. Structural conditionality has been used to encourage Croatia, Bosnia and Serbia to transfer politicians and soldiers to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia [ICTY]. Our thesis is that this exercise of structural conditionality polarized, mediated and contextualized Serbian politics in ways that were initially successful but ultimately insufficient. We empirically explore the effects of structural conditionality on political attitudes in Serbia in 2005 using a representative survey conducted in Belgrade. Inferences are drawn about Serbia's recent election and further removed events in Darfur.
Keywords: international law, humanitarian law, ICTY, war crimes
JEL Classification: K33
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation