Reason-Giving and Accountability

75 Pages Posted: 3 Jun 2008 Last revised: 10 Jul 2009

See all articles by Glen Staszewski

Glen Staszewski

Michigan State University College of Law

Date Written: 2009

Abstract

This Article explains that elected officials are not politically accountable for their specific policy decisions in the manner that is typically envisioned by modern public law. It claims, however, that public officials in a democracy can be held deliberatively accountable by a requirement or expectation that they give reasoned explanations for their decisions that could be accepted by free and equal citizens with fundamentally competing perspectives. The Article contends that the political accountability paradigm that currently dominates American public law should be discarded as a basis for legitimizing specific policy decisions in favor of an enhanced focus on deliberative accountability. It explains that a paradigm shift in our understanding of democratic accountability would have significant implications for the proper conception of the structure of American democracy, which would help to resolve some of the most contested issues in the fields of constitutional theory, administrative law, and legislation. Finally, it points out that a paradigm shift of this nature would also have tangible implications for certain individual rights, which are illustrated by the controversy over the appropriate legal treatment of same-sex marriage.

Keywords: accountability, deliberation, constitutional theory, administrative law, legislation, statutory interpretation, direct democracy

Suggested Citation

Staszewski, Glen, Reason-Giving and Accountability (2009). Minnesota Law Review, Vol. 93, No. 4, 2009, MSU Legal Studies Research Paper No. 06-09, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1140230

Glen Staszewski (Contact Author)

Michigan State University College of Law ( email )

420 Law College Building
East Lansing, MI 48824-1300
United States
517-432-6888 (Phone)
517-432-6879 (Fax)

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
238
Abstract Views
1,111
Rank
233,480
PlumX Metrics