Marriage and Class

QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, Vol 112 No 1, February 1997

Posted: 12 Nov 1997

See all articles by Ken Burdett

Ken Burdett

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics

Melvyn G. Coles

University of Essex - Department of Economics; Autonomous University of Barcelona; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Abstract

Here we consider a matching model where agents are heterogeneous and utilities nontransferable. We utilize this framework to study how equilibrium sorting takes place in marriage markets. We impose conditions that guarantee the existence of a steady state equilibrium and then characterize it. Several examples are developed to illustrate the richness of equilibria. The model reveals an interesting sorting externality that can support multiple steady state equilibria, even with constant returns to matching.

JEL Classification: D83

Suggested Citation

Burdett, Ken and Coles, Melvyn G., Marriage and Class. QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, Vol 112 No 1, February 1997, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=11528

Ken Burdett (Contact Author)

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics ( email )

3718 Locust Walk
439 McNeil Building
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States

Melvyn G. Coles

University of Essex - Department of Economics ( email )

Wivenhoe Park
Colchester CO4 3SQ
United Kingdom
+44 1206 873333 (Phone)
+44 1206 872724 (Fax)

Autonomous University of Barcelona

Plaça Cívica
Cerdañola del Valles
Barcelona, Barcelona 08193
SPAIN

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

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