Marriage and Class
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, Vol 112 No 1, February 1997
Posted: 12 Nov 1997
Abstract
Here we consider a matching model where agents are heterogeneous and utilities nontransferable. We utilize this framework to study how equilibrium sorting takes place in marriage markets. We impose conditions that guarantee the existence of a steady state equilibrium and then characterize it. Several examples are developed to illustrate the richness of equilibria. The model reveals an interesting sorting externality that can support multiple steady state equilibria, even with constant returns to matching.
JEL Classification: D83
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Burdett, Ken and Coles, Melvyn G., Marriage and Class. QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, Vol 112 No 1, February 1997, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=11528
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