Voting Games and Computational Complexity

Posted: 2 Jul 2008

See all articles by Glenn W. Harrison

Glenn W. Harrison

Georgia State University - J. Mack Robinson College of Business

Tanga McDaniel

Appalachian State University - Department of Economics

Abstract

Voting rules over three or more alternatives suffer from a general problem of manipulability. However, if the rule is difficult to manipulate, in some formal computational sense that is intrinsic to the rule or some cognitive sense specific to the set of voters, then one might not observe manipulation in practice. We evaluate this hypothesis using controlled laboratory experiments. We conclude that one voting rule, due originally to Condorcet, is indeed behaviorally incentive-compatible despite being theoretically manipulable if the underlying preference environment is sufficiently diverse that voters have difficulty ascertaining others preferences.

JEL Classification: C92, D72

Suggested Citation

Harrison, Glenn William and McDaniel, Tanga, Voting Games and Computational Complexity. Oxford Economic Papers, Vol. 60, No. 3, pp. 546-565, 2008, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1154401 or http://dx.doi.org/gpm045

Glenn William Harrison (Contact Author)

Georgia State University - J. Mack Robinson College of Business ( email )

P.O. Box 4050
Atlanta, GA 30303-3083
United States
407-489-3088 (Phone)
253-830-7636 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.cear.gsu.edu/

Tanga McDaniel

Appalachian State University - Department of Economics ( email )

Boone, NC 28608
United States

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