Influence Without Confidence: Upper Chambers and Government Formation

31 Pages Posted: 14 Jul 2008

See all articles by James N. Druckman

James N. Druckman

University of Rochester - Department of Political Science; Northwestern University - Department of Political Science

Lanny W. Martin

Rice University - Department of Political Science

Michael F. Thies

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Department of Political Science

Date Written: 2005

Abstract

In most parliamentary democracies, governments must maintain the confidence of the lower chamber only. But in bicameral parliaments, upper chambers can affect the fortunes of government policy proposals. Recent work shows that parliamentary governments that lack control over the upper house also tend to collapse sooner than those with upper house majorities. In this paper, we show that coalition builders anticipate the importance of upper chamber status (majority or minority) in making their formation decisions. Controlling for a host of "usual suspect" variables concerning the institutional, ideological, and partisan context of coalition building, and examining 15,590 potential governments in 129 bargaining situations, we find that potential coalitions that control upper house majorities are significantly more likely to form than are those with upper house minorities. Our findings are important for students of bicameralism, government formation, institutions, and, perhaps most significantly, for those who study policy making in parliamentary democracies.

Suggested Citation

Druckman, James N. and Martin, Lanny W. and Thies, Michael F., Influence Without Confidence: Upper Chambers and Government Formation (2005). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1158663 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1158663

James N. Druckman

University of Rochester - Department of Political Science ( email )

Rochester, NY 14627
United States

Northwestern University - Department of Political Science ( email )

601 University Place (Scott Hall)
Evanston, IL 60201
United States
847-491-7450 (Phone)

Lanny W. Martin

Rice University - Department of Political Science ( email )

Houston, TX 77005-1892
United States

Michael F. Thies (Contact Author)

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Department of Political Science ( email )

405 Hilgard Ave.
Los Angeles, CA 90095-1472
United States
310-825-1976 (Phone)
310-825-0778 (Fax)