One Share-One Vote: The Empirical Evidence

Posted: 14 Jul 2008

See all articles by Renee B. Adams

Renee B. Adams

University of Oxford

Daniel Ferreira

London School of Economics - Department of Finance; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: 2008

Abstract

We survey the empirical literature on disproportional ownership, i.e. the use of mechanisms that separate voting rights from cash flow rights in corporations. Our focus is mostly on explicit mechanisms that allow some shareholders to acquire control with less than proportional economic interest in the firm (dual-class equity structures, stock pyramids, cross-ownership, etc.), but we also briefly discuss other mechanisms, such as takeover defenses and fiduciary voting. We provide a broad overview of different areas in this literature and highlight problems of interpretation that may arise because of empirical difficulties. We outline potentially promising areas for future research.

Keywords: G32, G34

Suggested Citation

Adams, Renée B. and Ferreira, Daniel, One Share-One Vote: The Empirical Evidence (2008). Review of Finance, Vol. 12, Issue 1, pp. 51-91, 2008, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1159634 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/rof/rfn003

Renée B. Adams (Contact Author)

University of Oxford ( email )

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Oxford, OX1 1HP
Great Britain

Daniel Ferreira

London School of Economics - Department of Finance ( email )

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London, WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom
(+44) 20 7955 7544 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://personal.lse.ac.uk/FERREIRD/

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

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1000 Brussels
Belgium

HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

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