Analyzing the Case for Government Intervention in a Representative Democracy

72 Pages Posted: 16 Jul 2008

See all articles by Timothy J. Besley

Timothy J. Besley

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Stephen Coate

Cornell University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Date Written: September 1997

Abstract

The welfare economic method for analyzing the case for government intervention is often criticised for ignoring the political determination of policies. The standard method of accounting for this critique studies the case for intervention under the constraint that the level of the instrument in question will be politically determined. We criticise this method for its implicit assumption that new interventions will not affect the level of existing policy instruments. We argue that this assumption is particularly misleading in suggesting that political economy concerns must dampen the case for intervention.

JEL Classification: D20, D80, H11, H70, L22, P11

Suggested Citation

Besley, Timothy J. and Coate, Stephen, Analyzing the Case for Government Intervention in a Representative Democracy (September 1997). LSE STICERD Research Paper No. TE335, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1160956

Timothy J. Besley (Contact Author)

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Department of Economics ( email )

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Stephen Coate

Cornell University - Department of Economics ( email )

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