Rethinking the Regulatory Treatment of Securitization

36 Pages Posted: 23 Jul 2008 Last revised: 8 Jun 2013

See all articles by Vittoria Cerasi

Vittoria Cerasi

Corte dei conti; Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca - Center for European Studies (CefES)

Jean-Charles Rochet

University of Toulouse Capitole - Toulouse School of Economics

Date Written: July 1, 2008

Abstract

In a model where banks play an active role in monitoring borrowers, we analyze the impact of securitization on bankers’ incentives across different macroeconomic scenarios. We show that securitization can be part of the optimal …financing scheme for banks, provided banks retain an equity tranche in the sold loans to maintain proper incentives. In economic downturns however securitization should be restricted. The implementation of the optimal solvency scheme is achieved by setting appropriate capital charges through a form of capital insurance, protecting the value of bank capital in downturns, while providing additional liquidity in upturns.

Keywords: solvency regulation, securitization, capital insurance, monitoring

JEL Classification: G21, G38

Suggested Citation

Cerasi, Vittoria and Rochet, Jean-Charles, Rethinking the Regulatory Treatment of Securitization (July 1, 2008). Paolo Baffi Centre Research Paper No. 2008-21, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1170982 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1170982

Vittoria Cerasi (Contact Author)

Corte dei conti ( email )

viale Mazzini
Roma, Roma 00195
Italy

Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca - Center for European Studies (CefES) ( email )

U6 Building
Viale Piero e Alberto Pirelli, 22
Milano, 20126
Italy

Jean-Charles Rochet

University of Toulouse Capitole - Toulouse School of Economics ( email )

Toulouse
France

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