Devolution in the Provision of Merit and Impure Public Goods: Who Gains, Who Loses
19 Pages Posted: 12 Mar 2009 Last revised: 9 Nov 2011
Date Written: November 3, 2011
Abstract
In this article we propose a model that explains why devolution in the real world may be implemented even when efficiency would call for a centralised solution. In a context where Central Government delegates to lower tiers the provision of merit and impure public goods, fiscal federalism has particular characteristics that have not received due attention: (i) the equalisation grant which plays a crucial role; (ii) cross border provision which gives rise to financial agreements that need to be regulated. In a context of full information and in a setting where the traditional benefits arising from fiscal federalism are ignored, our model shows that fiscal federalism, although sub-optimal for the whole community, may be welfare improving for the richest local authority because it reduces the amount of the equalisation grant.
Keywords: Fiscal federalism, decentralisation, impure public goods, merit goods, cross border supply
JEL Classification: I18, H77
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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