Dunning Delinquent Dads: the Effects of Child Support Enforcement on Child Support Receipt by Never Married Women

38 Pages Posted: 12 Nov 1998 Last revised: 18 Sep 2022

See all articles by Richard B. Freeman

Richard B. Freeman

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); University of Edinburgh - School of Social and Political Studies; Harvard University; London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Centre for Economic Performance (CEP)

Jane Waldfogel

IZA Institute of Labor Economics; Columbia University - School of Social Work; London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE)

Date Written: July 1998

Abstract

Since the mid-1970s, the number of single-parent families has increased greatly in the U.S., contributing to the nation's child poverty problem. In response, the federal government and various states have tried to increase child support payments from non-custodial parents. Using data from administrative records and from the child support modules in the Survey of Income Program and Participation (SIPP) and the April and March Current Population Surveys (CPS), we find that the proportion of never married mothers receiving child support rose sharply in the 1980s and 1990s, with the largest increases in states where child support payment were particularly modest. Using within-state variation over time to determine the effect of policy on child support payments, we estimate that increased government expenditures on child support policies are responsible for about one fifth of the upward trend. Our results show that child support expenditures and tougher child support legislation policies work best in tandem. States that both increased expenditures and adopted tougher laws experienced the largest increase in the proportion of never married mothers receiving support.

Suggested Citation

Freeman, Richard B. and Waldfogel, Jane, Dunning Delinquent Dads: the Effects of Child Support Enforcement on Child Support Receipt by Never Married Women (July 1998). NBER Working Paper No. w6664, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=122636

Richard B. Freeman (Contact Author)

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Jane Waldfogel

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