Does the Stiglerian Theory of Regulation Explain the Audit Firm Lobbying Before the FASB?
7 Pages Posted: 19 Aug 2008 Last revised: 20 Feb 2018
Date Written: August 15, 2008
Abstract
This paper articulates the necessary and sufficient conditions for testing Stigler's (1971) theory of regulation with specific reference to audit firm lobbying before FASB.
Keywords: Political Economy, Stigler, Theory of regulation, FASB, Lobbying, Audit
JEL Classification: D72, K23, L30, L51, M41, P16
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Feroz, Ehsan H. and Hagerman, Robert, Does the Stiglerian Theory of Regulation Explain the Audit Firm Lobbying Before the FASB? (August 15, 2008). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1230383 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1230383
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