The Limits of Equality: An Economic Analysis of the Israeli Kibbutz
Journal of Economic History, Vol. 67, No. 2, pp. 495-499, 2007
Posted: 18 Aug 2008
Date Written: August, 18 2008
Abstract
My dissertation is a theoretical and empirical analysis of the puzzle that the Israeli Kibbutzim (plural of Kibbutz) present to economists. Kibbutzim are communities whose aim is equal-sharing; thus, they are expected to unravel because of moral hazard and adverse selection problems. Yet, the Kibbutzim have persisted for most of the twentieth century and formed one of the largest communal movements in history. I ask: How did Kibbutzim mitigate the problems of moral hazard and adverse selection? What limits their level of equality? And, what is the role of economic factors in communities often claimed to be driven by ideology? My dissertation contributes to our understanding of organizations that are subject to the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard, including professional partnerships, cooperatives, and labor-managed firms, which are often based on revenue sharing. More generally, it contributes to a wide range of literature incorporating economic analysis into the study of social institutions
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