Preserving Slave Families for Profit: Traders' Incentives and Pricing in the New Orleans Slave Market

56 Pages Posted: 1 Sep 2008 Last revised: 9 Jan 2022

See all articles by Charles W. Calomiris

Charles W. Calomiris

Columbia University - Columbia Business School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Jonathan B. Pritchett

Tulane University - Finance & Economics

Date Written: August 2008

Abstract

We investigate the determinants of slave family discounts, using data from the New Orleans slave market. We find large price discounts for families which cannot be explained by scale effects, childcare costs, legal restrictions, or transport costs. Because family members cared for each other, sellers found it advantageous to keep some families together. Evidence from the manifests of ships carrying slaves to be sold in New Orleans provides direct evidence for our model of selectivity bias in explaining slave family discounts. Children likely to have been shipped with their mothers are 1-2 inches shorter than other children.

Suggested Citation

Calomiris, Charles W. and Pritchett, Jonathan B., Preserving Slave Families for Profit: Traders' Incentives and Pricing in the New Orleans Slave Market (August 2008). NBER Working Paper No. w14281, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1261468

Charles W. Calomiris (Contact Author)

Columbia University - Columbia Business School ( email )

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Jonathan B. Pritchett

Tulane University - Finance & Economics ( email )

A.B. Freeman School of Business
7 McAlister Drive
New Orleans, LA 70118
United States

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