A Dynamic Analysis of the Demand for Health Insurance and Health Care
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. 2008-084/3
53 Pages Posted: 19 Sep 2008
There are 3 versions of this paper
A Dynamic Analysis of the Demand for Health Insurance and Health Care
A Dynamic Analysis of the Demand for Health Insurance and Health Care
A Dynamic Analysis of the Demand for Health Insurance and Health Care
Date Written: September 11, 2008
Abstract
We investigate the presence of moral hazard and advantageous or adverse selection in a market for supplementary health insurance. For this we specify and estimate dynamic models for health insurance decisions and health care utilization. Estimates of the health care utilization models indicate that moral hazard is not important. Furthermore, we find strong evidence for advantageous selection, largely driven by heterogeneity in education, income and health preferences. Finally, we show that ignoring dynamics and unobserved fixed effects changes the results dramatically.
Keywords: supplementary private health insurance, health care utilization, advantageous selection, moral hazard, panel data
JEL Classification: I11, D82, G22, C33
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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