The Impact of Ethiopia's Productive Safety Net Programme and its Linkages

33 Pages Posted: 29 Sep 2008

See all articles by Daniel O. Gilligan

Daniel O. Gilligan

International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI)

John Hoddinott

Cornell University - Charles H. Dyson School of Applied Economics and Management

Alemayehu Seyoum Taffesse

International Fool Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) - CGIAR

Date Written: September 25, 2008

Abstract

This paper assesses the impact of Ethiopia's Productive Safety Nets Programme (PSNP), the largest social protection program in sub-Saharan Africa outside of South Africa. Using Propensity Score Matching techniques, we find that the programme has little impact on participants on average, due in part to transfer levels that fell far below program targets. Beneficiary households that received at least half of the intended transfers experienced a significant improvement in food security by some measures. However, participants with access to both the PSNP and packages of agricultural support are more likely to be food secure, to borrow for productive purposes, use improved agricultural technologies, and operate non-farm own business activities. For these households, there is no evidence of disincentive effects in terms of labour supply or private transfers. However, beneficiaries did not experience faster asset growth.

Keywords: Ethiopia, safety nets, food security, PSNP, matching

JEL Classification: O12, I38

Suggested Citation

Gilligan, Daniel O. and Hoddinott, John and Taffesse, Alemayehu Seyoum, The Impact of Ethiopia's Productive Safety Net Programme and its Linkages (September 25, 2008). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1273877 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1273877

Daniel O. Gilligan

International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) ( email )

2033 K St., NW
Washington, DC 20006-1002
United States
202-862-8146 (Phone)
202-467-4439 (Fax)

John Hoddinott (Contact Author)

Cornell University - Charles H. Dyson School of Applied Economics and Management ( email )

Ithaca, NY
United States

Alemayehu Seyoum Taffesse

International Fool Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) - CGIAR ( email )

1201 Eye St, NW,
Washington, DC 20005
United States

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