Axiomatic Districting
12 Pages Posted: 6 Oct 2008 Last revised: 17 Jan 2010
Date Written: January 4, 2010
Abstract
In a framework with two parties, deterministic voter preferences and a type of geographical constraints, we propose a set of simple axioms and show that they jointly characterize the districting rule that maximizes the number of districts one party can win, given the distribution of individual votes (the "optimal gerrymandering rule"). As a corollary, we obtain that no districting rule can satisfy our axioms and treat parties symmetrically.
Keywords: districting, gerrymandering
JEL Classification: D72
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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