Axiomatic Districting

12 Pages Posted: 6 Oct 2008 Last revised: 17 Jan 2010

See all articles by Clemens Puppe

Clemens Puppe

University of Karlsruhe; Karlsruhe Institute of Technology

Attila Tasnadi

Corvinus University of Budapest

Date Written: January 4, 2010

Abstract

In a framework with two parties, deterministic voter preferences and a type of geographical constraints, we propose a set of simple axioms and show that they jointly characterize the districting rule that maximizes the number of districts one party can win, given the distribution of individual votes (the "optimal gerrymandering rule"). As a corollary, we obtain that no districting rule can satisfy our axioms and treat parties symmetrically.

Keywords: districting, gerrymandering

JEL Classification: D72

Suggested Citation

Puppe, Clemens and Puppe, Clemens and Tasnadi, Attila, Axiomatic Districting (January 4, 2010). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1279032 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1279032

Clemens Puppe

University of Karlsruhe ( email )

Kaiserstrasse 12
Karlsruhe, 76128
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.wior.uni-karlsruhe.de/LS_Puppe/Personal/puppe_home

Karlsruhe Institute of Technology ( email )

Kaiserstraße 12
Karlsruhe, Baden Württemberg 76131
Germany

Attila Tasnadi (Contact Author)

Corvinus University of Budapest ( email )

Fovam ter 8
Budapest, H-1093
Hungary

HOME PAGE: http://www.uni-corvinus.hu/~tasnadi

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