Voting for Mobile Citizens

MAGKS Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics No. 17-2008

23 Pages Posted: 6 Oct 2008

See all articles by Matthias Wrede

Matthias Wrede

University of Erlangen-Nuremberg-Friedrich Alexander Universität Erlangen Nürnberg - Institute of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Date Written: September 1, 2008

Abstract

This paper analyzes inter- and intraregional redistribution in a centralized state using the citizen-candidate model. It focuses on conflicting interests among regions and among citizens of varying mobility. If discrimination with respect to place of residence and degree of mobility is possible, diversity of interests is high. Under the plurality rule and with sincere voting, the largest socioeconomic group of citizens supplies the winning candidate and discriminates against all other groups. However, if discrimination with respect to the degree of mobility is constrained, mobile citizens may gain power and interregional redistribution is reduced.

JEL Classification: D7, H1

Suggested Citation

Wrede, Matthias, Voting for Mobile Citizens (September 1, 2008). MAGKS Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics No. 17-2008, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1279395 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1279395

Matthias Wrede (Contact Author)

University of Erlangen-Nuremberg-Friedrich Alexander Universität Erlangen Nürnberg - Institute of Economics ( email )

Germany

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de

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