The Governance of Intangibles: Rethinking Financial Reporting and the Board of Directors

Accounting Forum 36 (2012), pp. 279-293

EconomiX Working Paper No. 2008-36

33 Pages Posted: 28 Oct 2008 Last revised: 11 Nov 2012

See all articles by Yuri Biondi

Yuri Biondi

Université Paris-Dauphine, PSL Research University - National Center for Scientific Research

Antoine Reberioux

Université Paris VII Denis Diderot; University Antilles Guyane - Faculty of Law and Economics

Date Written: March 23, 2010

Abstract

This paper develops a theoretical analysis of performance measurement systems (including related accounting standards) and the composition of the Board in the context of business models driven by complementarities, innovation and intangibles. Performance management systems frame and shape the representation of business performance and risk, while the composition of the Board is designed to control and govern the business processes and disclosure of information over time. Complementarities, intangibles and innovation exacerbate the information asymmetry that characterizes the specific economy of the business firm, making it different from external markets. Therefore, firm-specific information becomes as important as market prices to gauge the past and future performance and risk of the ongoing business firm. Specific knowledge of the firm is therefore required to disclose relevant and reliable information and to monitor corporate executives. This argues for the role of improved historical cost accounting systems coupled with non-independent, proficient Board members.

Keywords: intangibles, board composition, financial regulation, accounting regulation, international accounting standards, corporate governance, fraud, Enron, Lehman Brothers

JEL Classification: G34, M41, D80

Suggested Citation

Biondi, Yuri and Reberioux, Antoine, The Governance of Intangibles: Rethinking Financial Reporting and the Board of Directors (March 23, 2010). Accounting Forum 36 (2012), pp. 279-293 , EconomiX Working Paper No. 2008-36, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1288707

Yuri Biondi (Contact Author)

Université Paris-Dauphine, PSL Research University - National Center for Scientific Research ( email )

France

HOME PAGE: http://yuri.biondi.free.fr/

Antoine Reberioux

Université Paris VII Denis Diderot

2, place Jussieu
Paris, 75005
France

University Antilles Guyane - Faculty of Law and Economics ( email )

Pointe à Pitre
France

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