Why Underwrite Rights Offers? Some New Evidence
Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 46, pp. 223-261, 1997
49 Pages Posted: 28 Oct 2008
Abstract
We examine rights issues on the Oslo Stock Exchange, where seasoned public offerings now take place almost exclusively through use of the relatively expensive standby underwriting method rather than unsinsured rights. We show that the propensity to use standby underwriting increases as expected shareholder takeup decreases, that the market reaction to uninsured rights offers is significantly positive, and that standbys elicit the least favorable market reaction to the public issue announcement. These and other cross-sectional results are consistent with the asymmetric information framework of Eckbo and Masulis (1992) and help resolve the longstanding rights offer paradox.
Keywords: Rights offer, standby underwriting, seasoned equity offer, flotation costs, shareholder takeup, adverse selection
JEL Classification: G32
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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