Credibility of Managerial Forecast Disclosure in Market and Regulated Settings

International Journal of Financial Services Management, Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 83-98, 2008. https://doi.org/10.1504/IJFSM.2008.016700

Posted: 3 Nov 2008 Last revised: 12 Apr 2023

See all articles by Michael Dobler

Michael Dobler

Dresden University of Technology - Faculty of Economics and Business Management

Date Written: February 21, 2007

Abstract

This paper discusses the ability of models on cheap talk, and of audit and liability regulations, to provide analytically-based assessment of credibility of management forecast disclosure in market and regulated settings. While credibility is linked to restrictive conditions in pure market settings, regulatory enforcement does not necessarily contribute to forecast credibility. Key findings imply that ex ante approaches, including audit and tort liability in general, as well as partly verifiable disclosures supplementing the forecast and safe harbour provisions in particular can contribute to forecast credibility. Overall results suggest that the usefulness of managerial forecast disclosure should not be overestimated, as neither market nor regulatory mechanisms can overcome the problems related to non-verifiability.

Keywords: audit regulations, cheap talk, credibility, forecast disclosure, liability regulations, credibility, management forecasts, financial reporting

JEL Classification: M41, M42

Suggested Citation

Dobler, Michael, Credibility of Managerial Forecast Disclosure in Market and Regulated Settings (February 21, 2007). International Journal of Financial Services Management, Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 83-98, 2008. https://doi.org/10.1504/IJFSM.2008.016700, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1292886

Michael Dobler (Contact Author)

Dresden University of Technology - Faculty of Economics and Business Management ( email )

Helmhotzstr. 10
Dresden, D-01062
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://tu-dresden.de/bu/wirtschaft/bwl/wus

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