'Lending by Example': Direct and Indirect Effects of Foreign Banks in Emerging Markets

51 Pages Posted: 2 Dec 2008

See all articles by Mariassunta Giannetti

Mariassunta Giannetti

Stockholm School of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Swedish House of Finance

Steven Ongena

University of Zurich - Department Finance; Swiss Finance Institute; KU Leuven; NTNU Business School; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: September 2008

Abstract

Using a novel dataset that allows us to trace the primary bank relationships of a sample of mostly unlisted firms, we explore which borrowers are able to benefit from foreign bank presence in emerging markets. Our results suggest that the limits to financial integration are less tight than the static picture of bank-firm relationships implies. Even though foreign banks are more likely to engage large and foreign-owned firms, they do not terminate relationships with the clients of banks they acquire as often as domestic financial acquirers do. Most importantly, firms appear to have the same access to financial loans and ability to invest whether they borrow from a foreign bank or not. Since firms without bank relationships make lower use of financial loans, and invest less, our results suggest that by making relationships more stable and by indirectly enhancing access to the financial system, foreign banks may benefit all firms.

Keywords: competition, emerging markets, foreign bank lending, lending relationships

JEL Classification: G21, L11, L14

Suggested Citation

Giannetti, Mariassunta and Ongena, Steven R. G., 'Lending by Example': Direct and Indirect Effects of Foreign Banks in Emerging Markets (September 2008). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP6958, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1308029

Mariassunta Giannetti (Contact Author)

Stockholm School of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 6501
Sveavagen 65
SE-113 83 Stockholm
Sweden
+46 8 736 9607 (Phone)
+46 8 312 327 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/site/mariassuntagiannetti/Home

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org

Swedish House of Finance ( email )

Drottninggatan 98
111 60 Stockholm
Sweden

Steven R. G. Ongena

University of Zurich - Department Finance ( email )

Schönberggasse 1
Zürich, 8001
Switzerland

Swiss Finance Institute

c/o University of Geneva
40, Bd du Pont-d'Arve
CH-1211 Geneva 4
Switzerland

KU Leuven ( email )

Oude Markt 13
Leuven, Vlaams-Brabant 3000
Belgium

NTNU Business School ( email )

Norway

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
3
Abstract Views
1,060
PlumX Metrics