Taking States Out of the Workplace

Yale Law Journal Pocket Part, Vol. 177, 2008

University of Tennessee Legal Studies Research Paper No. 53

6 Pages Posted: 7 Dec 2008 Last revised: 6 Apr 2009

See all articles by Jeffrey M. Hirsch

Jeffrey M. Hirsch

University of North Carolina School of Law

Date Written: December 6, 2008

Abstract

Current governance of the workplace originates from local, state, and federal governments. In some areas, such as private-sector labor law under the National Labor Relations Act, there is a single source of law supported by a unified enforcement scheme. Yet much of the time a given workplace dispute will fall under the laws of different jurisdictions, each of which gives rise to multiple causes of action. The result is an unjustifiably complex workplace governance system that undermines its own goals. Of more immediate concern is a recent movement to make this problem worse by increasing states' power to regulate the workplace. This argument, which is the latest iteration of a long-running federalism debate, has gained more traction recently because of the justified perception that recent enforcement of federal workplace laws has been inadequate. I agree that enforcement is a serious problem, but draw the opposite inference. If the goal is to increase enforcement of existing workplace protections, we should not only resist giving states more power; we should take away the power that they currently possess.

Keywords: employment, labor, union, federalism

JEL Classification: K31, J58, J71. J78

Suggested Citation

Hirsch, Jeffrey M., Taking States Out of the Workplace (December 6, 2008). Yale Law Journal Pocket Part, Vol. 177, 2008, University of Tennessee Legal Studies Research Paper No. 53, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1312484

Jeffrey M. Hirsch (Contact Author)

University of North Carolina School of Law ( email )

Van Hecke-Wettach Hall, 160 Ridge Road
CB #3380
Chapel Hill, NC 27599-3380
United States
919-962-7675 (Phone)

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