Download This PaperInterval Game Theoretic Division Rules
CentER Discussion Paper Series No. 2008-97
19 Pages Posted: 10 Dec 2008
Date Written: November 7, 2008
Abstract
Interval bankruptcy problems arise in situations where an estate has to be liquidated among a fixed number of creditors and uncertainty about the amounts of the estate and the claims is modeled by intervals. We extend in the interval setting the classic results by Curiel, Maschler and Tijs (Bankruptcy games, Zeitschrift fuer Operations Research, 31 (1987), A 143 - A 159) that characterize division rules which are solutions of the cooperative bankruptcy game.
Keywords: cooperative games, interval data, bankruptcy problems
JEL Classification: C71
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Branzei, Rodica and Dall'Aglio, Marco and Tijs, Stef H., Interval Game Theoretic Division Rules (November 7, 2008). CentER Discussion Paper Series No. 2008-97, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1313613 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1313613
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