Economic Consequences of Accounting Enforcement Reforms: The Case of Germany

46 Pages Posted: 30 Dec 2008 Last revised: 9 Feb 2012

See all articles by Jürgen Ernstberger

Jürgen Ernstberger

Technische Universität München

Michael Stich

University of Regensburg

Oliver Vogler

Ruhr University of Bochum

Date Written: July 27, 2011

Abstract

This study investigates recent reforms in financial reporting enforcement in Germany. The objective of these reforms was to promote a consistent and faithful application of accounting standards. Using a differences-in-differences approach, we find some evidence of a decrease in earnings management, an increase in stock liquidity, and, to a limited extent, an increase in market valuation for companies that fall under the new enforcement regime. Our results also provide some support for the notion that companies characterized by an overall low level of enforcement through other internal and external mechanisms are particularly affected by these reforms. The results are largely robust in several sensitivity analyses, but the results must be interpreted with caution because we cannot completely rule out the possibility of other explanations.

Keywords: enforcement, regulation, IFRS, earnings management, stock liquidity, market valuation

JEL Classification: M41, M48

Suggested Citation

Ernstberger, Jürgen and Stich, Michael and Vogler, Oliver, Economic Consequences of Accounting Enforcement Reforms: The Case of Germany (July 27, 2011). European Accounting Review, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1321674

Jürgen Ernstberger (Contact Author)

Technische Universität München ( email )

Arcisstraße 21
Munich, 80333
Germany

Michael Stich

University of Regensburg ( email )

93040 Regensburg
D-93040 Regensburg, 93053
Germany

Oliver Vogler

Ruhr University of Bochum ( email )

Universitätsstraße 150
Bochum, NRW 44780
Germany

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
1,200
Abstract Views
4,373
Rank
32,697
PlumX Metrics