Survey Evidence on Conditional Norm Enforcement

20 Pages Posted: 4 Feb 2009

See all articles by Christian Traxler

Christian Traxler

Hertie School; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Joachim K. Winter

Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich (LMU); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Munich Center for the Economics of Aging (MEA); Deutsche Bundesbank - Research Department

Date Written: January 2009

Abstract

We discuss survey evidence on individuals' willingness to sanction norm violations - such as evading taxes, drunk driving, fare dodging, or skiving off work - by expressing disapproval or social exclusion. Our data suggest that people condition their sanctioning behavior on their belief about the frequency of norm violations. The more commonly a norm violation is believed to occur, the lower the individuals' inclination to punish it. Based on an instrumental variable approach, we demonstrate that this pattern reflects a causal relationship.

Keywords: Norm Enforcement, Sanctioning, Social Norms, Survey Evidence

JEL Classification: K42, Z13, D1

Suggested Citation

Traxler, Christian and Winter, Joachim K., Survey Evidence on Conditional Norm Enforcement (January 2009). MPI Collective Goods Preprint, No. 2009/3, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1337455 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1337455

Christian Traxler (Contact Author)

Hertie School ( email )

Friedrichstrasse 180
Quartier 110
Berlin, 10117
Germany

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) ( email )

Poschingerstr. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Joachim K. Winter

Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich (LMU) ( email )

Geschwister-Scholl-Platz 1
Munich, DE Bavaria 80539
Germany

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Munich Center for the Economics of Aging (MEA) ( email )

Amalienstrasse 33
Munich, 80799
Germany

Deutsche Bundesbank - Research Department ( email )

PO Box 10 06 02
D60006 Frankfurt
Germany

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
107
Abstract Views
1,293
Rank
460,674
PlumX Metrics